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Notes and Comments
Yoram Dinstein* Science, Technology and
Human Rights
I. Introduction
The rapid development of science and technology, particularly in
the last generation, has had a tremendous impact on human rights.
Many, perhaps most, human rights are adversely affected - in
actuality or potentiality - by modern machines.' The subject has
been discussed at great length by scientists and statesmen, lawyers
and laymen, preachers and futurologists. But, to understand it in its
proper perspective, it is believed that a typological approach is
called for. It is necessary to distinguish between four different types
of cases, in accordance with the nature of the relationship between
science and technology, on the one hand, and human rights, on the
other. The relationship may be subsumed under four alternative
headings:
(i) Science and technology may be at the root of a human rights
problem and, at the same time, at the root of its solution.
(ii) Science and technology may be neither at the root of a human
rights problem nor at the root of its solution.
(iii) Science and technology may not be at the root of a human
rights problem, yet may be at the root of its solution.
(iv) Science and technology may be at the root of a human rights
problem without being at the root of its solution.
The first type of cases is especially germane to the subject of air
pollution. Air pollution is produced primarily (though not
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1. In a seminar convened by the United Nations in Vienna, in 1972, the impact of
recent scientific and technological developments on the following human rights
was discussed: (a) the right to privacy; (b) the right to democratic government; (c)
the fight to work; (d) the right to rest and leisure; (e) the right to health; (f) the fight
to food; (g) the fight to education and culture. Seminar on Human Rights and
Scientific and Technological Developments (Vienna, 1972) 7-12 (Document
ST/TAO]HR/45. The list is by no means exhaustive.
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exclusively) by the emission of fumes from automobile exhausts
and industrial smokestacks. The phenomenon of smog, which is
now virtually taken for granted in urban and industrial centers,
infringes on the enjoyment of the human right to health. 2 The
quality of air in the developed countries has declined steadily in the
last decades, and in some places air pollution has already caused
many fatalities. 3 The hazards to health emanate from the scientific
and technological advances that made the industrial revolution
possible and that brought about the car era. Yet science and
technology can also alleviate the problem through the development
of pollution control devices, which can be installed in cars, 4 as well
as in industrial plants. 5 Pollutants may even be removed altogether.
Thus, an electric car may possibly replace the omnipresent vehicle
with the internal combustion engine spewing noxious gases. Hence,
science and technology are at the root of the problem, but they are
also at the root of the (complete or partial) solution, provided, of
course, that society is willing to spend the required resources in
order to make that solution practicable.
The very discussion of air pollution in terms of human rights may
give some people pause. Generally speaking, environmentalists are
inured to examining pollution issues through the lens of State duties
rather than human rights. Still, the obligation devolving on a State
to keep the level of pollution within reasonable bounds may be
viewed as corresponding to the human right to health. In other
words, it is arguable that the individual human being is entitled to
insist, as of right, on the State taking the necessary technological
measures so as to make the environment more congenial to his or
her health. This submission is corroborated by the text of the 1966
2. On the human right to health, see Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights cited in note 6, infra, as well as Article 25
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949 Supp.), 43 Am. J. Int.
L. 127 at 131; Article 5(e) (iv) of the 1965 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, [ 1965 ] United Nations Juridical
Yearbook 63 at 66; and Article I I of part II of the 1961 European Social Charter
(1949-1961), 1 European Conventions and Agreements 338 at 346
3. See Anonymous, "Considerations of Technological and Economic Factors in
Air Pollution Control" (1975), 44 Cincinnati L. Rev. 573 at 580
4. See Anonymous, "Legal Aspects of Banning Automobiles from Municipal
Business Districts" (1971), 7 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 412 at 413
5. On available forms of air pollution control technology with respect to sulphur
oxide emissions (produced by burning coal), see W. F. Cockrell, "Coal
Conversion by Electric Utilities: Reconciling Energy Independence and Environ-
mental Protection" (1976-77), 28 Hastings L.J. 1245 at 1267-1268
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(which came into force in 1976). Article 12 of the Covenant
proclaims:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall
include those necessary for:
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and
industrial hygiene. 
6
Looking at ecological problems from the vantage point of human
rights signifies that every person has an interest protected by law to
live in uncontaminated surroundings. If the idea is carried to its
logical conclusion, every individual should have a procedural jus
standi (before judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies) to
complain against violations of his or her substantive right to health.
Given the will to do so, all pollution hazards may be categorized as
contraventions of human rights. 7
The second type of linkage between science, technology and
human rights is largely based on an optical illusion. By way of
illustration, as a result of recent scientific advances, it is now
possible, through prenatal and at times even pre-conceptional
parental screening, to determine whether a fetus is afflicted with
certain defects. 8 If it is established that the fetus has, e.g., Down's
syndrome (mongolism), the question arises whether society can
impose abortion on the pregnant mother. 9 After all, deformed
children are a burden to society in the modem welfare State, and
there may be a collective interest not to be encumbered with the
onus of raising them. This collective interest may, however, collide
head-on with the individual interest of the prospective mother to
give birth to her child. A related bone of contention is at what point
a fetus turns into a human being, so that performance of an abortion
6. [1966] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 170 at 174
7. Cf. H. L. Dickstein, "National Environmental Hazards and International Law"
(1974), 23 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 426 at 439
8. See J. R. Waltz and C. R. Thigpen, "Genetic Screening and Counseling: the
Legal and Ethical Issues" (1973-74), 68 Nw.U.L. Rev. 696 at 699-701
9. On the legal, ethical and religious issues pertaining to compulsory abortion of
defective progeny, see J. M. Friedman, "Legal Implications of Amniocentesis"
(1974-75), 123 U.Pa.L. Rev. 92 at 122ff.
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will transgress against its right to life.' 0 These are intricate issues
with profound legal, ethical and even religious connotations.
Nevertheless, science and technology, though ostensibly involved,
are in fact at the root neither of the problem (congenital deformity or
mental retardation) nor of the possible solution (abortion). The role
played by science and technology in this context is very limited:
they merely enable us to become aware of the problem ahead of
time (before birth) and consequently make it possible to consider
anticipatory measures. But only ethics and law can cope with the
problem and offer a solution.
The third type lies in between the two preceding categories. Here
science and technology, while not at the root of the human rights
problem, are at the root of the solution. Take organ transplantation
as an example. The scarcity of organs available for transplantation
creates an excess of demand over supply, and the selection of
recipients is literally tantamount to a life-or-death decision. 1 When
there is one donor and three patients in dire need of a new kidney or
heart, whose life will be extended (it being understood that selecting
one individual to live implies exclusion of the others who may
thereby be doomed)? The dilemma is grave, though not entirely
new. Doctors have always had to determine which patient should
get priority treatment and, particularly during an epidemic, the
choice is liable to have terminal consequences for those not
fortunate enough to benefit from immediate medical attention. But
what is the solution? On ethical grounds, the problem is well-nigh
insoluble. Moralists and lawyers have been arguing about it, in one
form or another, since the dawn of civilization, without getting any
closer to the fount of justice. Attempts are now being made to
propose (or at least to consider) legal principles for allocation of
scarce medical resources, such as dialysis treatment for kidney
failures. 12 However, it must be borne in mind that, in part, the issue
can be settled on technological grounds. That is to say, dialysis
treatment may become more readily available if the costs are
defrayed by society. And in theory it is possible to replace human
10. The modem tendency is to regard the fight to life as commencing at the stage
of viability (when the fetus is potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid). See N. Shapiro-Libai, "The Right to Abortion" (1975), 5
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 120 at 134
II. See Anonymous, "Patient Selection for Artificial and Transplanted Organs"
(1968-69), 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1322
12. See Anonymous, "Scarce Medical Resources" (1969), 69 Colum. L. Rev.
620-691
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organs by artificial devices, which will make it unnecessary to
search for donors for transplantation.
Finally, there are instances in which science and technology are
only at the root of the human rights problem, but not at the root of
the solution. This is, perhaps, the least understood category, so it
deserves some elaboration. A simple illustration is that of the
polygraph or the breathylizer. These are devices, produced by
modem technology, which can be used to undermine the
fundamental freedom from self-incrimination.' 3 As such they create
a problem. A suspect may be compelled (even by law) to exhale and
give a breath sample for an analysis that may reveal consumption of
alcohol. 14 And refusal to take a polygraph test15 may be regarded as
evidence of consciousness of guilt. 16 But this is not up to scientists
and technologists to determine. It is for lawyers to decide whether
the results of lie-detector or breath-detector tests should be
admissible in evidence in a criminal trial and, if so, what the ground
rules ought to be.
Other examples relate to the potentially deleterious effect of
surveillance contrivances and computers on the human right to
privacy.1 7 The use of sophisticated auditory and visual surveillance
methods - such as wiretapping and photographing - make it
possible to monitor and record confidential conversations at great
distances. 18 The proliferation of data processing devices in the age
of the computer has provided the means to gain and disseminate
intimate information concerning almost every individual.' 9 The
13. On freedom from self-incrimination, see Article 14(3) (g) of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [1966] United Nations
Juridical Yearbook 178 at 183; Article 8(2) (g) of the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights (1971), 65 Am. J. Int. L. 679 at 683
14. See B. M. Dickens, "The Control of Living Body Materials" (1977), 27 U.
Toronto L. J. 142 dt 176
15. On the precise meaning of a polygraph test, see Anonymous, "Pinnochio's
New Nose" (1973), 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 339 at 340-41
16. See Anonymous, "The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial" (1973), 73
Colum. L. Rev. 1120 at 1143
17. On the human right to privacy, see Article 12 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 2 at 129; Article 17 of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 13 at 183-84;
Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1949-61), 1 European Conventions and Agreements 21 at
25; Article I I of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, supra, note 13
at 683
18. See J. F. Murphy, "An International Convention on Invasion of Privacy"
(1975-76), 8 N.Y.U. J. Int. L. & Pol. 387 at 394-95 and 409
19. See A. R. Miller, "Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: the Challenge of a
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intrusion into, indeed the invasion of, privacy is starkly obvious.
Still another example pertains to the spheres of information and
education. Modem technology renders brainwashing feasible:
George Orwell's Big Brother is here several years ahead of the
schedule of 1984. Brainwashing makes a mockery of the human
rights to information 20 and to education. 2 1 Brainwashing may
appear to be a form of imparting information and implanting
education. But forced information or education runs counter to the
basic concepts underlying the human rights in question. If you take
the human right to education, its essence is not education per se;
i.e., any education. The thrust of the right is attaining education of
the person's (or the parents') choice. The important thing is not to
have education, but to have education in accordance with one's
convictions. 2 2 We do not want educated robots, but educated
human beings. Education in the form of brainwashing, imposed on
a person against his will, is therefore a violation of human rights.
An even more radical case in point is that of "perverted science"
(to use Winston Churchill's famous expression 23), which was
employed by the Nazis to torture human beings to death through
so-called experimentations. In these agonizing processes inmates of
concentration camps were subjected to poisons, epidemics, freezing
conditions and extremely high altitudes. 24 Not to mention that
technology enabled the Nazis to produce the Holocaust, viz., the
efficient extermination of millions of Jews in the gas chambers.
New Technology in an Information - Oriented Society" (1968-69), 67 Mich. L.
Rev. 1091 at 1107-1109
20. On the human right to information, see Article 19 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 2 at 130; Article 19 of the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 13 at 184; Article
10 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra, note 17 at 26; Article 13 of the 1969 American
Convention on Human Rights, supra, note 13 at 684
21. On the human right to education, see Article 26 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 2 at 131-132; Article 13 of the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra, note 6 at
174-75; Article 5 (e) (v) of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra, note 2 at 66; Article 2 of 1952 Protocol
(No. 1) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1949-196 1), 1 European Conventions and Agreements 39
at 40
22. See Y. Dinstein, "The International Human Rights of Soviet Jewry" (1972), 2
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 194 at 202
23. W. S. Churchill, Speech (June 18, 1940), Into Battle 234 (1941)
24. J. Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1972) at 292ff.
Science, Technology and-Human Rights
In all these instances the promotion of human rights is menaced
by scientific and technological inventiveness. Yet science and
technology are mute when it comes to seeking a solution to the
problem. Only the barriers of ethics and law can save humanity
from such technological "progress".
II.
What do the four types of relationships between science, technology
and human rights indicate? They indicate, to my mind, that, as
Rabelais stated, "science without conscience is but the ruin of the
soul". 25 It is conscience that should rule the use of science and
prevent the abuse of it.
It is often suggested that science is neutral, and that no scientific
invention per se can possibly have an inimical impact on human
rights. Only those who put science to use are supposed to be putting
stumbling blocks in the path of fundamental freedoms. That is true
in many cases, but we must not regard it as an infallible verity. To
give an extreme example, one can discover a virus that will
eliminate the whole of mankind in a few minutes. Such scientific
gifts we can do without, irrespective of the identity of the scientist
and the Government in whose hands the secret will repose. An issue
which is perhaps not quite as patent - though it may very well be as
potent - in its repercussions is that of genetic engineering and
bionics. We are now faced with the possibility of the production of
''new versions of man", like clones (genetic copies of persons) and
cyborgs (mixtures of men and machines). 2 6 We may even
encounter, in the not too distant future, hybrids of men and apes
whose very presence on this planet will create a plethora of complex
ethical and legal problems. As has been pointed out, "experimenta-
tion in the direction in which molecular biology is now taking us is
experimentation . . . in morality and in law".27 We must remember
that law is an order of human behaviour.2 8 Hence the cardinal
question whether such hybrids can be viewed as human beings (who
25. F. Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532), Book II (Pantagruel), ch. 8
(Gargantua's letter to Pantagruel)
26. J.-G. Castel, "Legal Implications of Biomedical Science and Technology in
the Twenty-First Century" (1973), 51 Can. B. Rev. 119 at 123 and 127-128
27. T. A. Cowan, "Moral Creativity in Science and Law" (1967-68), 22 Rutgers
L. Rev. 446 at 461
28. See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1949) at 3
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are capable of bearing rights and duties under the law), or apes (who
are not). Science fiction? Perhaps. Still, it may be safer to make
sure that this brave new world of thinking animals does not
materialize.
The only way to ascertain that science does not inflict a calamity
on mankind is to distinguish between pure scientific research -
which must be allowed without any reservation or qualification -
and the practical technological application thereof. The fact that
scientific research has come up with something new does not
necessarily mean that we must automatically and blindly rush to
make technological use of it. Not every theoretical breakthrough
should be permitted to become a reality. An unlimited confidence in
science merely demonstrates ignorance of it. 29 Lawyers must
intervene to verify that some brilliant novel ideas remain in the form
of diagrams and equations. A risk-benefit analysis of infant
technology may end up with the decision not to open Pandora's
box.3
0
Most scientific discoveries and inventions pose no threat to
human rights, but they may be abused by those manipulating them.
Thus, it is a clich6 that the invention of the wheel was one of the
greatest advances in the ascendence of man. Yet, in the hands of the
Spanish Inquisition, the wheel had a pernicious effect by being
turned into a torture rack. As well, the same technological
breakthrough which launched the "green revolution" could
introduce apocalyptic dimensions into herbicide warfare. 3 ' Once
more lawyers must step in with a view to imposing safeguards that
will minimize the risks to society.
There is much built-in opposition to any attempt to regulate
science and technology, thus impinging on the laissez faire policy
which has predominated in this field since time immemorial. But
here, as in so many other areas of human endeavour, the laissez
faire policy is obsolete. As it is, there is no automatic transmutation
of pure science into applied science. A number of criteria are
currently resorted to before a decision is taken to move ahead.
Principally these are economic criteria. The question constantly
29. See E. Cahn, Confronting Injustice (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries
Press, 1972) at 363
30. See H. P. Green, "Law and Genetic Control: Public-Policy Questions"
(1976), 265 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 170 at 173-74
31. See E. Stein, "Impact of New Weapons Technology on International Law:
Selected Aspects" (1971), 133 Recueil des Cours 223 at 236
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asked is whether the proper economic return will ensue from a given
investment. But other considerations - social, psychological and
the like - also play their part in the decision making process. Thus,
an important technological undertaking may be aborted owing to
overriding reasons. What is suggested here is that another criterion
be added to those commonly accepted already, namely, the ethical
yardstick of the impact of a new invention on human rights.
Ill.
One of the main problems in the sphere of science, technology and
human rights (as in that of the environment) is the existence of a
"perception gap" between developed and developing (a
euphemism for under-developed) countries in regard to the dangers
confronting mankind.32 Frequently, developing countries adam-
antly refuse to let human rights considerations impede the progress
of bringing the benefits of science and technology to their peoples.
The proposition that emerges from the line that they espouse is, "let
us have as much applied science as possible, and on the
infrastructure of science and technology we shall build an edifice of
respect for human rights". On the other hand, developed nations -
that is to say, States that have already set up the scientific
infrastructure which developing countries strive to establish -
expostulate against abuses of science and technology. The
proposition that emanates from what they say is, "beware of
science and technology because development may come at the
expense of human rights". The situation, in other words, is
reminiscent of the Thousand-and-One-Nights story about the
fisherman and the genie. When the genie of science is concealed in
the bottle, we want it out so that it will fulfill our fanciful desires.
But when it is out, we feel threatened and want to secure it back in
the bottle. The Director General of the International Labour
Organization, in a report on man and the environment, has
appropriately referred to Goethe's sorcerer's apprentice, who finds
it easier to raise the spirit than to lay it back.
3 3
Developing nations believe that, as long as they have not raised
the spirit of science by themselves, human rights will remain intact
within their boundaries. Consequently, they feel and behave like
32. See C. M. Hassett, "Air Pollution: Possible International Legal and
Organizational Responses" (1972), 5 N.Y.U. J. Int. L. & Pol. I at 3 and 33
33. Technology for Freedom: Man in His Environment: the ILO Contribution
(1972) Part I at 2 - Report of the ILO Director General
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nonchalant spectators when developed countries relate tales of woe
about the negative aspects of science and technology. But
environmental disasters may take their toll across international
frontiers. In some places "black snow" has fallen owing to
pollution abroad. 34 The use of supersonic transports (SSTs)
anywhere may jeopardize life everywhere due to depletion in the
atmospheric ozone layer.3 5 And there are many other examples
(such as radiation from nuclear tests) which can attest that no nation
is remote enough to be immune.
The extraterritorial activity of developed States in the field of
applied science presents problems - at times even special problems
- for backward countries. This has been widely recognized insofar
as offshore fishing is concerned. Developing nations, whose
indigenous population may practically live on fishing carried out in
old-fashioned ways, resent the fact that modem fishing fleets from
developed States appear in front of their coasts and pre-empt the
natural resources of the seas. On the initiative of the Latin American
countries, international law is now in the process of being changed
through the introduction of 200-mile offshore exclusive economic
zones into which the entry of foreign fishing vessels is prohibited.
3 6
Thus, science and technology may have to stop in front of the
exclusive economic zone and give way to superior claims.
A somewhat different area of particular significance to developing
nations is the so-called brain drain, i.e., the emigration of top
scientists and professionals to well-developed States offering them
more lucrative positions. In a sense, this is not a question relating to
the impact of science and technology on human rights, but actually
a problem generated by the human rights of scientists and
technologists. Scientists and technologists, like all other persons,
are entitled to benefit from the human right of every person to leave
any country, including his own (freedom of emigration). 37 It is true
34. See E. Hambro, "The Human Environment: Stockholm and After" (1974), 28
Year Book of World Affairs 204 at 210
35. See H. L. Dickstein, "International Law and the Environment: Evolving
Concepts" (1972), 26 Year Book of World Affairs 245
36. See A. L. Hollick, "The Origins of the 200-Mile Offshore Zones" (1977), 71
Am. J. Int. L. 494-500
37. On freedom of emigration, see Article 13(2) of the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra, note 2 at 129; Article 12(2) of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 13 at 182; Article 5(d) (ii) of
the 1965 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra, note 2 at 65; Article 2(2) of the 1963 Protocol (no. 4) to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
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that the simultaneous departure of large numbers of, say, physicians
may have an exceedingly detrimental effect on a specific developing
country and, particularly in time of epidemic, their freedom of
emigration may have to be temporarily suspended. But total denial
of the right of scientists and professionals to leave a country would
create a modem form of indentured labour or white collar serfdom,
which is in flagrant violation of human rights. Evidently, if a person
received a grant from his Government, and contracted to work for it
for an agreed upon period, this contractual obligation has to be met
or financial compensation will have to be paid. But it does not
follow that a country may demand exhorbitant indemnity for all the
years of education from which an individual benefited, for that
would amount to an indirect curtailment of freedom of
emigration.38
It should be borne in mind that the brain drain may affect the
same country both as a contributor and as a recipient. Thus, for
instance, British physicians emigrate to the United States and
Canada, yet many Indian physicians immigrate to the United
Kingdom, and physicians from Nepal or Bhutan leave for India.
But, whereas a certain developing country may suffer grievously
from the brain drain, and special temporary concessions must be
made to it so as to prevent denuding it of the upper echelons of
scientists in time of emergency, developed States should never be
permitted to use the pretext of the brain drain to circumscribe
freedom of emigration. This is particularly true of a Big Power, and
that is why Soviet attempts to excuse violations of the rights of
Jewish scientists to emigrate to Israel by brandishing the banner of
the brain drain have not been crowned with success. When the
USSR imposed a "diploma tax" on all Jewish graduates from
institutions of higher learning (in 1972), the pressure of world
public opinion forced it to abolish the tax within less than a year.
3 9
IV.
We find ourselves in this sphere in a position somewhat akin to that
Freedoms (1961-1970), II European Conventions and Agreements 109 at 110;
Article 22(2) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, supra, note 13
at 686
38. See Y. Dinstein, "Freedom of Emigration and Soviet Jewry" (1974), 4 Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights 266 at 273-274
39. On the "diploma tax", see Z. Alexander, "Immigration to Israel from the
U.S.S.R." (1977), 7 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 268 at 292-296
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faced by mankind after the first sputnik had been launched into orbit
in 1957. Everybody realized forthwith that rules regulating the race
into outer space must eventually be formulated, but at the same time
everyone knew that more experience was needed before a definitive
draft could be essayed. Space lawyers had to weigh "the possible
dangers of attempting to crystallize the law too soon against the
certain dangers of waiting too long". 4 0 Only by trial and error have
the norms pertaining to outer space begun to consolidate over the
years.
The same is true in the field of science, technology and human
rights. Rules must ultimately emerge, but they cannot be set forth
conclusively yet. Currently we are in a speculative stage. Lawyers
speculate about possible developments in the future and offer
tentative solutions for consideration. Some believe, for instance,
that the time will come when a Cybernetics Treaty and a Molecular
Biology Treaty will be concluded as detailed codes of protective
measures. 41 It is quite palpable, however, that we are not ready for
such texts at this juncture.
When we take stock of the present situation, we can only state the
obvious by saying that scientific and technological progress must
not stop. If we are dissatisfied with some of the byproducts of that
progress, we must not lose sight of the enormous benefits that have
accrued to mankind from science. In 1811, when methods of
production changed with the industrial revolution, the Luddites
broke the new machines to which they attributed the economic ills
of that period. 42 Many people today seem to be similarly inclined,
though for different reasons. They want to destroy the machines that
pose a threat to human rights and fundamental freedoms. However,
smashing machines never helps. What we must do is control those
who make or operate the machines.
How to go about it? Some believe that national policies can
protect human rights from the hazards inherent in scientific and
technological advances. But that is not the case. National standards
may be useful within the boundaries of a single State. Still, only
international guidelines can possibly serve as a shield for the whole
of mankind. In the realm of ecology, too, for years exclusively
40. C. W. Jenks, Space Law (New York: Praeger, 1965) at 6
41. See C. W. Jenks, "The New Science and the Law of Nations" (1968), 17 Int.
& Comp. L. Q. 327 at 339
42. See J. S. Watson, The Reign of George 111, 1760-1815 (12 Oxford History of
England, 1960) at 570-571
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national (as distinct from international) standards were common.
This national approach and orientation brought parts of the Western
world to the verge of an environmental disaster. In some respects,
pollution has already caused irreversible harm to the environment: it
may be too late to try to rectify now the blunders of the past. Similar
blunders must not be perpetrated in regard to other subjects relevant
to science, technology and human rights. We must commence the
process of defining international ethical standards that will
determine the proper and improper uses of science and technology
from the viewpoint of human rights.
Defining criteria for the application of science and technology is
essential, but it is not enough. It is also imperative to establish
international control mechanisms that will supervise the implemen-
tation of these tenets. This crucial task cannot be left to the
discretion of governments, inasmuch as governments are often the
leading culprits in permitting science and technology to encroach on
human rights. If governments were the guardians of fundamental
freedoms from scientific usurpation, one is immediately led to ask
quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Proposals to set up an International
Ethics Review Board have already been put forward. 43 It is high
time that such a Board become a reality.
V. Conclusions
Our conclusions are:
1. The advancement of science and technology is of decisive
importance for the welfare of people everywhere.
2. Freedom of scientific research must not be impaired.
3. A distinction must be made between scientific research and
technological application. Not every new invention should
necessarily be realized in practice. As a general rule, new
inventions that are liable to be used primarily for the
infringement of human rights must be regarded as unacceptable.
4. When practical technological application is acceptable, it is
essential that it be subjected to regulation and control in
accordance with ethical standards. Abuse of new inventions
must be prevented.
43. See B. J. Gardner, "The Potential for Genetic Engineering: a Proposal for
International Legal Control" (1975-76), 16 Va. J. Int. L. 403 at 424ff.
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5. Ethical standards ought to be formulated on the international
level.
6. Impartial international control mechanisms should be set up to
weigh the various considerations and determine whether or not a
controversial scientific discovery is to be allowed actual
implementation.
7. The most fundamental principle is that man is the measure of all
things. Science and technology must be subservient to human
needs.
